What individual attributes and attitudes consistently shape perceptions of China among people in Asian 
The current study seeks to improve on past research in three main ways. First, we expand upon studies that have compared aggregate Asian public opinion about China by focusing on the individual as the unit of analysis. Some previous work has been done at the individual level. For example, examining the impact of the Beijing Olympics on the attitudes of American university students, Gries, et al. (2010) found that attitudes toward China actually declined following the Games, most notably among those individuals with less cosmopolitan attitudes and those exposed to more negative media coverage. While valuable, however, such findings may be specific to the U.S., or to university students,
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An alternative way to measure the effectiveness of China's promotion campaign has been to conduct content analysis of international media coverage. These studies find that despite the extensive effort, the Chinese government has largely been ineffective in seeking to influence or improve foreign media coverage of China (Zhang, 2010; Xing, 2007) . Other scholars have usefully adopted a comparative approach, contrasting Chinese conceptions and practice of soft power with Taiwan (Wang and Lu, 2008; deLisle, 2010) and with Japan (Heng, 2010) . The evidence suggests that China's approach to soft power has been far less effective than these Asian democracies. There has also been a flurry of studies examining the Chinese discourse on soft power (Wuthnow, 2008; Li, 2008; Cho and Jeong, 2008, Suzuki, 2009). and, therefore, of limited generalizability. In a study that drew on Asian Barometer Survey data, Wang and Ying (2009) compared views of China, the US, and Japan across six countries: Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
2 They found that women, respondents who paid attention to national and international affairs, and respondents who had travelled abroad all tended to have more positive views of China. Ethnicity, religion, and nationality were also found to have significant associations. While useful, their study does not test theoretically based sets of hypotheses, thus leaving questions of model specification largely unexplored.
Second, despite the fact that much work has been done on China's soft power, the hypothesis that more information about its culture can generate a greater affinity for the country and its foreign policy has not been subjected to empirical testing at the individual level. Even as the Chinese government continues to expand its soft power strategy through Confucius Institutes (Paradise, 2009; Guo, 2008) and other forms of public diplomacy (d 'Hoogh, 2007; Shambaugh, 2007) , several influential US institutions question the effectiveness of China's strategy (McGiffert, 2009 ). The
Congressional Research Service, for instance, (2008: viii) concludes that China's charm offensive has had 'mixed' success and that 'its influence remains modest.' While intuitively it makes sense that people who like Chinese culture will also be more favorable towards China and its foreign policy, this has yet to be compared cross-nationally. This article thus utilizes an item in the AsiaBarometer asking respondents about the frequency with which they watch Chinese television and films to examine whether a positive relationship exists between exposure to popular culture and perceptions of China.
Finally, the sample of societies in our study is larger than in previous studies. No study has tested individual-level hypotheses across samples from more than a handful of Asian societies. Any generalization about public views of China in Asia should include as wide a range of countries as possible. Our sample includes twelve countries across Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and India. The Asian Barometer (http://www.asianbarometer.org/) is a distinct survey project and should not be confused with the AsiaBarometer we use in this article.
We are particularly interested in assessing consistency -whether particular variables have an effect on perceptions of China across a number of national contexts. 3 For the purpose of this paper, a variable is defined as having a 'consistent' effect if evidence of its influence is found among respondents in at least half of the societies included in the sample. In the following section, we derive a series of hypotheses from five theoretical frames -interests, information and contacts, identity, core values, and demographic characteristics.
Interests
It is possible that people evaluate China based on how it is perceived to be affecting either their own material interests, or those of their country. Hermann, et al. (1997: 408) posit that the key question for a person when evaluating a foreign nation is 'do the other actor's intentions threaten to reduce my country's current achievements of valued objectives or does the other actor represent an opportunity for me to advance and expand my country's interests? ' Goldsmith, et al. (2005: 410) argue that mass publics are usually familiar with such interests, which they learn about from the media and political elites. It is possible that concerns over China as a threat to their society's material interests, or their own personal interests, may lead a person to have a more negative perception of China.
One of the greatest areas of concern among political elites in various countries is the effect of China's rapid economic growth, trade surplus, and power to attract foreign direct investment ('China's economy' 2003 Although the purpose of this paper is to examine differences in perceptions of China among individuals from the same country, it should also be noted that there are few controlled comparisons across countries considering if factors such as geographic proximity or having a democratic government influence individual attitudes toward China. Some evidence suggests that people in developing countries tend to have more positive attitudes toward China (Cooke, 2009; Alterman, 2009 ) but this claim has not been empirically examined to date.
economy as weak are especially likely to see China as an economic threat. We predict, therefore, that anxiety about domestic economic conditions should be consistently associated with unfavorable perceptions of China.
It is possible that people may consider the effects of more economic interdependence with
China on their personal well-being. Within Asian nations, those individuals with higher socio-economic status should be less anxious about China than those with lower status, since they may see benefits from Chinese economic activity through trade and the lower prices on goods while at the same time remaining secure in their professional or skilled jobs. In contrast, people with lower socio-economic status may feel greater anxiety about their personal circumstances and therefore be more concerned about the potential influence of China's economy. For example, the growing volume of Chinese exports is mostly likely to affect blue-collar workers' employment prospects ('Overseas and Under Siege' 2009). We hypothesize that higher socio-economic status should be consistently associated with more favorable perceptions of China's influence.
Another issue likely to concern Asian citizens is China's growing military power. Political elites' discourse and media coverage describing China as a potential threat to regional security likely affects public opinion. One survey report claims 'anxiety about the growing strength of China's military is nearly universal in Japan…that concern is shared with others' ('Publics of Asian Powers' 2006) . We propose that those individuals concerned about security issues will consistently have more unfavorable perceptions of China than those who are less concerned.
The movement of Chinese migrants in Asia may also be a source of anxiety among some people in the region. Domestic political elites and the media may raise concerns about both legal and illegal
Chinese immigrants to advance their own interests. Competition with Chinese immigrants for low-wage jobs raises unemployment fears for low-skilled workers in Asian nations, while reports of illegal immigration or crimes committed by Chinese immigrants also stoke public anxiety. Furthermore, ethnic Chinese citizens have repeatedly been subject to waves of discrimination throughout Southeast Asia. Given the highly politicized nature of immigration, we hypothesize that concern about immigration will be consistently associated with more unfavorable perceptions of China.
Information and Contacts
We derive our second set of hypotheses from what can be called the 'information, contacts and knowledge' theoretical framework. In short, familiarity with foreign nations in general and China in particular is likely to lead to more positive perceptions. This draws upon the psychological theory that increasing the amount or quality of intergroup contact reduces bias between particular groups (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002: 589) . Our assumption, therefore, is that greater information and direct contact with foreign nations and people in general, and with China in particular, will reduce an individual's hostility towards the PRC.
One of the most well-known generalizations in the study of foreign policy attitudes is that higher levels of education tend to be associated with greater support for internationalism (Holsti 1996: 178) . Education, it is assumed, increases information about foreign nations and, therefore, leads to lower levels of hostility. Page, et al. (2008: 33) advance a 'knowledge breeds friendship' hypothesis;
namely that formal education can have a socializing effect, encouraging more positive attitudes towards other countries. In Asia, it may be that more educated people will be more familiar with China and so not see it as a threat. In general, we posit that higher education should be consistently associated with more favorable perceptions of China.
Individuals who interact with foreigners and travel overseas are similarly likely to see other countries as less threatening. Familiarity and greater information should facilitate internationalist beliefs and encourage more positive attitudes towards other countries. Chiozza (2007: 112) 
Identity
Our third set of hypotheses is derived from a framework in which an individual's identity shapes their perceptions of China. Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995: 426) suggest that the image of a foreign nation is affected by judgments about its cultural sophistication and what norms of behavior it is likely to respect. Individuals may tend to trust those states that are perceived to be culturally similar to the groups they identify with and distrust those that are not (Carlson and Nelson 2008: 312) .
Ethnic identity is one factor that might influence perceptions of China in a positive way. A person who identifies him-or herself as a member of a particular ethnic group may have positive feelings towards a nation with a similar ethnicity (Page, Rabinovich, and Tully 2008: 33) . Even though they are citizens of other countries, and may have never lived in China nor speak the language, those individuals who identify themselves as Chinese might still feel an affinity for their country of ancestral
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Coined by Joseph Nye, the term soft power refers to the ability of a state to achieve its goals through attraction rather than coercion. "Soft power," Nye explains, "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others," including the "ability to entice and attract" (Nye and Wang, 2009) . Nye (2004: 6) suggests that survey data provides a valuable indicator of soft power. Yet to date, the burgeoning literature on China's soft power has focused overwhelmingly on the supply side-on China's efforts to improve its image abroad (Ding, 2008 and . 
Core Values
Our fourth set of hypotheses draw from theories of cognitive heuristics and the notion of 'core values. ' Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) argue that a person's values can shape their beliefs about a particular country because individuals can use these as part of a simplification strategy when dealing with a complex sphere of policy like foreign affairs. Given the ambiguity of information about China's behavior both domestically and in international politics, it may be a cost-effective strategy to rely on one's principles and beliefs as a guide in evaluations of China and its foreign policy.
One important value that may have an effect on views of China is an individual's level of patriotism. Patriotic individuals may favor their own country and view other foreign nations with suspicion. This preference for one's own country may lead to the resentment of the rapid rise of China, a country that was relatively recently considered backwards and poor. We hypothesize, therefore, that patriotism is consistently associated with more unfavorable perceptions of China.
A second value that may affect how a person perceives China is their level of religiosity. This concept is distinct from that of religious identity discussed above. Rather than the type of faith practiced, this concept focuses on the intensity of religious belief and practice in daily life. For some people, religion plays an important role in how they make sense of the world around them. As a result, they may feel hostility towards China as a Communist country that not only limits freedom of religion but also tries to control it. We hypothesize, therefore, that religiosity should be associated with more unfavorable perceptions of China.
A third value that may influence perceptions of China is respect for human rights. People concerned about civil and political liberties may feel hostility towards China because they perceive it as a threat to their notions of right and wrong. People interested in human rights throughout Asia are likely to be aware that China is regularly criticized by foreign leaders and international organizations for its treatment of its citizens. Suisheng Zhao (2009: 263) notes that 'there are many fundamental constraints on China's soft power promotion related primarily to China's political system, political values, and problems with its ongoing economic transformation. ' Gill and Huang (2006: 30) also point to China's 'gap between an increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign policy and a closed and rigid domestic political system.' For those individuals who view civil liberties as important, China may pose a symbolic threat to their values. We hypothesize that concern about human rights will be consistently associated with more unfavorable perceptions of China.
Socio-demographic Characteristics
We expect that socio-demographic characteristics may influence an individual's views of China.
This should occur primarily through the socialization process as well as a person's social networks.
Gender may also be a cause of different perceptions of Chinese influence, an effect that may be exacerbated in Asian nations where social and economic factors shape varying levels of access to information about foreign affairs for men and women. China during the Maoist era, while younger citizens are more likely to identify China as a growing economic power and source of both soft and hard power. The effects of age, however, are likely to depend upon a particular national context.
Data and Method of Analysis
To test these hypotheses at the individual level, we rely on the AsiaBarometer, a survey of Asian publics headquartered at Japan's University of Niigata Prefecture and University of Tokyo. For each society a nationwide survey of adults between the ages of 20 and 69 was conducted through multistage stratified random sampling and quota sampling. 6 The total sample size is 14,146 respondents.
Our method of econometric analysis is ordered probit estimation, which is appropriate when the All data in the AsiaBarometer were collected through face-to-face interviews by Nippon Research Center, Ltd. and its counterparts in each country/area included in the study. Although the questionnaire was originally formulated in English, survey companies in the target societies translated it into local languages before having it checked by country experts.
dependent variable is ordinal and of limited range (Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Long 1997) . This is a form of maximum likelihood estimation which is preferable to simple linear regression for such data.
Although coefficients' sign and significance may be interpreted much as in a linear model, the model is restricted to predict values only within the actual range of the dependent variable (for details on measurement of our independent variables, see Appendix 1). The dependent variable of interest is an individual's perceptions of China's influence, as measured by the following AsiaBarometer question:
'Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country?
Please select the response closest to your opinion.' Responses were measured using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (bad) to 5 (good). The original codes were reversed so that higher numbers indicate more positive views of China's influence. As the item asked about China's "influence," we interpret responses as an indicator of the overall evaluation of China and its foreign policy as it relates to their own society. We turn now to the results.
Perceptions of China by Country
We begin by comparing the perceptions of China across Asian societies. Table 1 describes aggregate responses to the question about China's influence.
INSERT TABLE 1
China's influence tends to be viewed on average as moderately positive in most Asian societies.
The mean of the fourteen aggregate scores for the response 'rather good' in Table 1 
Society-Specific Model Analysis
We turn now to our econometric models, which assess the association of each independent variable with individuals' perceptions of China's influence while controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. Variables are discussed according to our theoretically grouped hypotheses, with results in Table 2 grouped accordingly.
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INSERT TABLE 2
As predicted, concerns over how one's government is handling the domestic economy are consistently associated with negative perceptions of China. The coefficient for concern about government handling of the economy was negative and statistically significant in 8 of the 14 models - Finally, neither gender nor age was consistently associated with perceptions of China. The coefficient for male was statistically significant and positive only in Vietnam and Laos, suggesting that in the majority of cases men and women did not tend to have different perceptions of China. The age factor was also of limited significance. The coefficient for thirties was not statistically significant in any societies; forties was statistically significant and positive in South Korea and Laos and negative in Japan (all weakly, at 90%); fifties was statistically significant and positive in Singapore and negative in the Philippines (again, both weakly so); and sixties was statistically significant and negative in Japan (2006), Thailand, and (weakly) the Philippines. While age appears to be a factor influencing 8
We did attempt to include models with the other measures for patriotism but the effect was the same.
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Interestingly, it was positive and statistically significant in Thailand, Cambodia and (weakly) Vietnam. Although these are three societies that are predominantly Buddhist, we do not attempt to explain this finding here.
perceptions of China in a few societies, the effect was not consistent across the region.
Discussion
The purpose of this paper was twofold: to examine how Asian publics perceive China Our econometric analysis suggests that two factors consistently influence individual perceptions of China throughout Asia -concerns about a society's economy and familiarity with China itself. The literature on international images suggests that images of particular nations are based on whether they are considered to be a threat or opportunity (Boulding 1959; Holsti 1967; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995) . While military threats may have been the foremost factor shaping a nation's image during the Cold War, we suggest that in Asia today, the greatest concern about China is that it poses an economic
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As can be seen in the two AsiaBarometer surveys conducted in Japan, there are considerable differences in perceptions of China conducted in the same society over a span of just three years.
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In contrast, 2010, a year for which we have no survey data, saw various disputes between China and various Asian nations. For example, it refused to condemn North Korea for sinking the Cheonan ship; it made a sweeping claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea; and it reacted sharply toward Japan over a Chinese trawler ramming two Japanese coastguard vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It is possible that this series of events may have worsened regional public toward threat. This should not be too surprising, as Americans may also tend to view China more as an economic rather than military challenge. Fordham and Kleinberg (2011) , for example, found that economic interests help explain individual Americans' assessment of China as a danger. It is interesting to find that people in Asian societies, which are most directly affected by China's growing military power, also tend to evaluate China in economic rather than security terms. Further research could explore the conditions under which Asian citizens tend to see China (and the U.S.) as security threats, and seek to isolate which aspects of the domestic economy (unemployment, imports, foreign investment, etc) are associated with negative perceptions of China.
More broadly, the finding that concern about domestic economic interests are associated with more unfavorable perceptions of China suggests that economic conditions in China's Asian neighbors, or at least how their governments are perceived to be handling these conditions, will be an important factor in determining whether China is perceived as a threat or not. The finding that familiarity with Chinese popular culture is associated with more positive perceptions of China's influence suggests more traction for Chinese soft power in the region than most recent analysis has assumed (e.g., Wright, 2009 ). Greater familiarity with Chinese culture, it seems, does leads to more favorable perceptions. Furthermore, the relatively large percentage of respondents who see China's influence as neither good nor bad suggests that a considerable number of people in Asia remain ambivalent over whether China poses a threat or opportunity. Asia may thus be responsive to a well-designed and concerted future soft-power push by Beijing. Finally, this study contributes to China. Reiterations of a similar research project would help assess this claim.
the study of perceptions of China by identifying a number of factors that do not consistently structure perceptions of China through Asia. Twelve of our hypotheses found support only in particular cases, suggesting that analysts should think carefully before offering sweeping claims about broad trends in Notes: Data from AsiaBarometer; Question wording is "Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country? Please select the response closest to your opinion for each country listed…. China?" Sample size ranges from 1,000 to 1,052 including Don't know / No answer responses. -1080.28 -1205.95 -1221.13 -1014.32 -1282.27 -1270.17 -932.77 -1191.12 -1178.90 -1039.68 -1230.86 -1075.88 -1108.95 -1087 Worry about Security Issues: item asking respondents which issues caused them great worry, coded as a dichotomous or "dummy" variable, with 0=Not mentioned, 1=National security.
Frequency of Watching Chinese TV and Movies: item asking respondents how often they were exposed to Chinese TV programs, movies and animation produced in the PRC, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, with a 6-point scale, 1=Never, 6=Almost every day. Since this item was included only in the 2007 and 2008 AsiaBarometers, it is excluded from the models for 2006.
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Education: coded on a 3 point scale, with 1=Primary/lower secondary education, 3=tertiary
education.
Information and Contacts Index: summed index of six information and contact items, with 0=No contact with foreign nations or people and 6=High contact with foreign nations or people. The question does not distinguish between media from these sources, but asks about productions from "China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan)." We acknowledge that this introduces difficulty of interpretation because Hong Kong and Taiwan have well-known popular culture products distributed across East Asia.
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The indicator for a person's level of international information and contacts was measured using Carlson and Nelson's (2008, 314) 6 point scale derived from the items in the AsiaBarometer asking respondents which of these statements apply to them: "1" a member of my family or relative lives in another country; "2" I have traveled abroad at least three times in
